Post-quantum keys, where they can carry weight today.

QuantLayer Quantum implements FIPS 203, 204 and 205 in Rust (libcrux and fips205) and exposes them to TypeScript through Node-API. It protects identities, credentials and authorizations; it does not change how Ethereum accounts sign.

Signatures: ML-DSA and SLH-DSA

ML-DSA is the default: lattice-based, fast, 3,309-byte signatures at category 3. SLH-DSA rests only on hash functions; its slow signing suits long-lived roots of trust.
Sizes are fixed by the standards. Timings: medians on an Apple M2, Rust release build, measured in this repository (docs/pqc/BENCHMARKS.md).
AlgorithmStandardNIST categoryPublic keySignatureSignVerify
ML-DSA-44FIPS 20421,312 B2,420 B112 µs31 µs
ML-DSA-65FIPS 20431,952 B3,309 B156 µs46 µs
ML-DSA-87FIPS 20452,592 B4,627 B192 µs70 µs
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128sFIPS 205132 B7,856 B877 ms742 µs
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128fFIPS 205132 B17,088 B39 ms2.2 ms
SLH-DSA-SHA2-256sFIPS 205564 B29,792 B1,323 ms1.6 ms

Key encapsulation: ML-KEM

ML-KEM establishes a shared secret; it does not sign. QuantLayer uses ML-KEM-768 to seal proof witnesses to the proving worker.
Sizes are fixed by the standards. Timings: medians on an Apple M2, Rust release build, measured in this repository (docs/pqc/BENCHMARKS.md).
AlgorithmStandardNIST categoryPublic keyCiphertextEncapsulateDecapsulate
ML-KEM-512FIPS 2031800 B768 B6.4 µs6.6 µs
ML-KEM-768FIPS 20331,184 B1,088 B11.0 µs11.5 µs
ML-KEM-1024FIPS 20351,568 B1,568 B15.3 µs16.3 µs

Hybrid authorization

A classical key and an ML-DSA-65 key sign the same domain-separated input. The request is allowed only if both verify, so neither a classical nor a post-quantum break alone is enough.
Requestcanonical messageQUANTLAYER-SIG-V1Hybrid inputQUANTLAYER-HYBRID-V1quantlayer.authorization/1Ed2551964-byte signatureML-DSA-653,309 bytes, FIPS 204Encoded3,379 bytes6 + 64 + 3,309both verifyA failure of either half denies the request

Key custody and lifecycle

Custody keys are generated in the Rust module and sealed under a key-encryption key. Only public keys, signatures and KEM shared secrets leave it.
pendinggenerated, cannot signactivesigns; one per keyretiredverifies history onlyrevokedstops verifyingdestroyedsealed secret erasedPqcKeyState, enforced in Rust (quantlayer-pqc)Rotation retires version n and activates n+1 with a dual-signed transition statement.

Rotation and cryptographic agility

A verification method keeps its identifier while its algorithm changes. Algorithm identifiers are versioned in the protocol and on-chain.
k1, version 1history still verifiesEd25519status: retiredk1, version 2signs new requestsML-DSA-65status: activerotate-key, single-use challengeTransition statementauthorised by version 1possession proven by version 2The algorithm may change on rotation: classical to post-quantum
Rotation
Same algorithm, new version; the previous version is retired and keeps verifying history.
Migration
A new algorithm of the same kind (for example ML-DSA-65 to ML-DSA-87), with a transition statement signed by both versions.
Revocation
Terminal: the version stops verifying and its sealed secret is erased.

Migration architecture

Today
Identity keys may already be ML-DSA or SLH-DSA; credentials can be issued by post-quantum issuers; authorizations can require hybrid or post-quantum evidence.
On-chain
QuantLayerAuthorizationManager accepts post-quantum evidence through an EIP-712 attestation from a k-of-n attestor set, and reports the result as Attested.
Path to trustless
Arbitrum Stylus (ML-DSA in WASM), a future precompile, or a ZK proof of ML-DSA verification can replace the attestors without changing the manager’s interface.

What this does not claim