Prove the fact. Keep the record.

QuantLayer proves statements about credentials without revealing them: membership, validity, a threshold over a hidden value, single use per scope. It does not make transactions private.

Zero-knowledge proofs

Noir circuits, proved with Barretenberg UltraHonk over BN254. Proofs are 8,768 bytes; native proving takes about 0.7 s on an Apple M2.
Private witnessnullifierSecrettrapdoorattributesaltissuedAt, expiresAtpath: 20 siblingsleaf indexProver onlyNoir circuitleaf is in the tree rootissuedAt ≤ now < expiresAtattribute ≥ thresholdnullifier for this scopeeligibility v1BoundaryProofUltraHonk-BN2548,768 bytesPublic inputscontextrootissuercredentialTypenowthresholdscopenullifier
CircuitStatementPublic inputs
membershipThe prover is a member of the identity set root; nullifier is its tag for scope.context, root, scope, nullifier
credential-ownershipThe prover holds a credentialType credential in issuer’s tree root.context, root, issuer, credentialType
credential-validityOwnership, and issuedAt <= now < expiresAt.context, root, issuer, credentialType, now
balance-thresholdA currently valid credential whose hidden attribute is >= threshold.context, root, issuer, credentialType, now, threshold
nullifier-uniquenessOwnership; nullifier is the holder identity’s one-time tag for scope.context, root, issuer, credentialType, scope, nullifier
eligibilityA current credential with attribute >= threshold, usable once per scope.context, root, issuer, credentialType, now, threshold, scope, nullifier

Commitments and private witnesses

Every value is domain-tagged so a hash for one purpose can never stand in for another.
Identity commitment
Poseidon over the holder’s nullifier secret and trapdoor, tagged quantlayer.identity.v1. Only the commitment is registered.
Credential leaf
Poseidon over issuer, holder commitment, type, attribute, validity window and a random salt, tagged quantlayer.zk-credential.v1.
Private witness
The secret, the opening and the Merkle path. It exists only for the duration of proving and never reaches a verifier.
Delegated proving
Available, with the witness sealed to the platform’s ML-KEM-768 key before it is queued. The worker does see it; local proving is preferred.

Merkle proofs

Depth 20: about a million leaves per tree. Removing a leaf zeroes it; its slot is never reused.
Rootpublished on-chainQuantLayerCredentialRegistrylevel 19sibling 19levels 18 to 2level 1sibling 1LeafcredentialLeaf(…)Holder keepsleaf, path, saltPoseidon-BN254,domain-taggedquantlayer.merkle.node.v1

Selective disclosure

quantlayer.credential/2: one salted digest per claim. The issuer decides which claims are required and which optional.
Issuersigns the documentkeeps no claim valuesML-DSA-65 in custodyclaim digestssubject commitmentstatus list entryHolderaccepts after checkingsignature, binding, digestsclaims, saltsreveal: level, countryVerifiersees revealed claims onlyissuer signaturestatus listholder bindingaudience, noncequantlayer.credential/2A presentation is bound to one audience and one nonce:replaying it to another verifier fails.

Nullifiers and replay protection

Nullifier
Derived from the holder’s secret and a scope (quantlayer.nullifier.v1). The same holder in the same scope always yields the same value; across scopes the values are unlinkable.
On-chain
QuantLayerNullifierRegistry records spent nullifiers; a second use in a scope is rejected.
Proof context
Every proof is bound to the chain, the verifier contract, the consumer, the app, the circuit and a fresh nonce. A proof for one request does not verify for another.
Presentations
Bound to the verifier’s audience and nonce; replaying a presentation to another verifier fails.

Credential validity and revocation

Validity
credential-validity proves issuedAt ≤ now < expiresAt inside the circuit, against the verifier’s now.
Status list
Revoke, suspend and reinstate republish an issuer-signed status list. Presentations are checked against it.
On-chain status
QuantLayerCredentialRegistry tracks None, Active, Suspended and Revoked; Revoked is terminal.
Root revocation
An issuer can revoke a compromised root immediately, skipping the grace period for superseded roots.

What privacy does not cover