A decision you can replay and audit.

Requests are built and signed by the client, then evaluated against an immutable, versioned policy. Every decision returns allow or deny, a reason code and the trace of each step.

Evidence modes

A policy names exactly one mode. The assurance column is what the on-chain manager reports for that mode.
ModeEvidenceOn-chain assurance
classicalEd25519 or ES256K signature by a registered keyTrustless on-chain (EIP-712 ECDSA)
post-quantumML-DSA or SLH-DSA signature, verified in RustAttested on-chain
hybridClassical and ML-DSA-65 over the same input; both must verifyClassical half on-chain, post-quantum half attested
credentialA quantlayer.credential/2 presentation with required claimsStatus on-chain, presentation attested
zk-eligibilityAn UltraHonk proof bound to the request digestTrustless on-chain

Policy evaluation

The engine runs these steps in order and stops at the first that fails.
  1. 01requestWell-formed, canonical, a known version
  2. 02evidenceEvidence present and well-formed for the mode
  3. 03policyPolicy version exists, is active, not retired
  4. 04bindingChain, contract, app domain and action allowed
  5. 05timeNot yet expired, lifetime within the policy limit
  6. 06revocationKey versions and the request id not revoked
  7. 07subjectIdentity active, keys belong to it, purpose matches
  8. 08verificationEvery signature, credential or proof verifies
  9. 09replayNonce unused for this subject and domain

Hybrid authorization

Requestcanonical messageQUANTLAYER-SIG-V1Hybrid inputQUANTLAYER-HYBRID-V1quantlayer.authorization/1Ed2551964-byte signatureML-DSA-653,309 bytes, FIPS 204Encoded3,379 bytes6 + 64 + 3,309both verifyA failure of either half denies the request

Policies

Versioned and immutable
Publishing creates a new version with a digest; a minimum version retires older ones.
Binding
Chain ids, contracts, app domains and action patterns the request must match.
Requirements
Allowed classical schemes, post-quantum algorithms, hybrid schemes, credential issuers and claims, or a circuit with pinned public inputs.
Key purpose
The key must hold the purpose the policy names, for example authentication.

Expiration and replay protection

Lifetime
issuedAt and expiresAt in Unix seconds; the lifetime may not exceed the policy’s limit, with bounded clock skew.
Nonce
32 random bytes, single-use per subject and domain. A replay is denied with NONCE_REPLAYED.
Request id
Unique per request; emergency revocation can cancel a request id before it is used.
Digest
The EIP-712 digest of the request equals the contract’s QuantLayerAuthorizationHash, so the same request is checked off-chain and on-chain.

Stated limits