Question. Can QuantLayerAuthorizationManager verify ML-DSA (FIPS 204) signatures
natively in Solidity, the way it verifies ECDSA with ecrecover?
Answer. Not practically. A lower bound for ML-DSA-65 is about 22.5 million
gas per verification. That is about 7,500 times ecrecover (3,000 gas) and
70% of Arbitrum's 32M per-transaction gas limit, and it leaves out decoding and
norm checks. QuantLayer therefore verifies post-quantum signatures off-chain and brings
them on-chain through an explicit, non-trustless attestation (see
ONCHAIN_PROTOCOL.md §5).
Method
We implemented and tested ML-DSA's two dominant kernels in Solidity, measured
their gas cost, and extrapolated with an explicit operation count. The code is in
contracts/test/bench/. It is benchmark-only and is not deployed.
| Kernel | Implementation | Correctness check |
|---|---|---|
| Keccak-f[1600] (SHAKE128/256) | KeccakF1600.permuteReference (plain Solidity) and KeccakF1600.permute (unrolled inline assembly) | Keccak-256 built on the permutation is fuzzed against the KECCAK256 opcode, including block boundaries. SHAKE128/256 match FIPS 202 known answers, including multi-block squeeze. The assembly version is fuzzed against the reference. |
| NTT over Z_q[X]/(X²⁵⁶+1), q = 8380417 | MlDsaNtt.ntt / invNtt (reference) and MlDsaNtt.nttAsm (assembly loops) | invNtt(ntt(a)) = a. invNtt(ntt(a) ∘ ntt(b)) equals the schoolbook negacyclic product (fuzzed). The assembly NTT is fuzzed against the reference. |
The EVM's KECCAK256 opcode only exposes Keccak-256 with fixed padding.
ML-DSA needs SHAKE128/SHAKE256 with arbitrary-length output, so a native
verifier has to run the permutation in EVM code.
Reproduce:
cd contracts && pnpm exec forge test --match-contract PqcFeasibility -vvMeasurements (Foundry 1.7.1, solc 0.8.28, optimizer 200 runs, Cancun)
| Operation | Gas |
|---|---|
| Keccak-f[1600], reference Solidity | 739,164 |
| Keccak-f[1600], unrolled assembly | 98,294 |
| NTT (256 coefficients), reference | 381,134 |
| NTT, assembly | 184,121 |
| Inverse NTT, reference | 426,267 |
Pointwise mulmod product, per coefficient | 210 |
ecrecover (precompile), for comparison | 3,000 |
ML-DSA-65 verification estimate (k = 6, l = 5)
| Step | Count | Gas |
|---|---|---|
| SHAKE permutations: ExpandA (30 polynomials × ~5 SHAKE128 blocks), tr = H(pk) (1,952 B), μ, SampleInBall, H(μ ‖ w1) | ~175 | 17,201,450 |
| NTTs: NTT(z) ×5, NTT(c), NTT(t1·2ᵈ) ×6, inverse ×6 | 18 | 3,314,178 |
| Pointwise products: A·z (6×5×256) + c·t1 (6×256) | 9,216 | 1,935,360 |
| Calldata: signature 3,309 B + public key 1,952 B (16 gas/byte upper bound) | 5,261 B | 84,176 |
| Lower-bound total | ≈ 22.5M |
The estimate is a lower bound. It omits:
- bit-unpacking of z, h and t1;
- rejection sampling in ExpandA and SampleInBall;
- the infinity-norm check;
- hint application (UseHint);
- w1 encoding;
- memory expansion across 30 polynomials.
Expert-optimized implementations might cut the measured kernels by a further 2–3×, which would still put verification in the multi-million-gas range. ML-DSA-87 and SLH-DSA are larger still: SLH-DSA verification needs thousands of hash calls.
Conclusion and consequences
Not on the EVM today. At ≥ 22.5M gas, one verification consumes most of an Arbitrum transaction. It can't be composed with application logic, and cost grows with the parameter set. We don't ship a Solidity ML-DSA verifier.
Off-chain verification plus attestation. QuantLayer Quantum (libcrux, FEAT-07) or the TypeScript engine verifies the signature. A k-of-n quorum of registered attestors signs an EIP-712
PqcAttestationthat the chain checks. This is a trust assumption, and every on-chain result says so (Assurance.Attested).Hybrid keeps a trustless classical half. In hybrid mode, the ECDSA half of the request is verified on-chain. A failure of the attestors alone can't authorize a request without the subject's classical key.
Ways to remove the trust assumption later.
- Arbitrum Stylus: verify ML-DSA in WASM (Rust, libcrux), which is far cheaper per operation than EVM bytecode. This is the most promising path.
- A future precompile for ML-DSA or SHAKE.
- A ZK proof of ML-DSA verification: prove "this ML-DSA signature verifies" in a SNARK. Recursion is costly to prove, but cheap to verify on-chain.
The
algorithmfield and proof-system versioning leave room for any of these without changing the manager's interface.